The Istanbul Agreements of July 2022: What Did the Grain Initiative Documents Establish?
What the Istanbul agreement of July 2022 established: the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the Joint Coordination Centre, inspection rules and how it ended.
Why It Matters
The Istanbul agreements of 22 July 2022 were the only negotiated arrangement between Russia and Ukraine to reopen a commercial shipping lane during the war. They consisted of the Black Sea Grain Initiative and a parallel Russia–UN memorandum, and they set up a Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul to run the corridor. Reading the documents and the parties' own statements explains what was actually promised, what operated in practice, and why the arrangement lapsed in July 2023.
Background
Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine's Black Sea ports were effectively closed to commercial traffic. The UN and others warned about the effect on global food and fertilizer markets, since both Ukraine and Russia are major exporters of wheat, maize, sunflower products and fertilizer inputs.
The diplomatic track ran through the UN Secretary-General's office and Türkiye. Turkish officials held talks with Russian and Ukrainian counterparts through spring and early summer 2022, and a four-party military and technical meeting took place in Istanbul in July 2022.
The documents were concluded at Dolmabahçe Palace on 22 July 2022 in the presence of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and UN Secretary-General António Guterres. As widely reported, Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Ukrainian Infrastructure Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov took part. Russia and Ukraine did not sign one shared text; each concluded a parallel, matching document with Türkiye and the UN. For the wider diplomatic story, see Crossroads Review's account of Türkiye's mediation and the Initiative.
What the documents established
Two instruments were concluded on the same day:
- The Black Sea Grain Initiative (formally the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports). It covered grain, other foodstuffs and fertilizer, including ammonia, moving from three ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny (Pivdennyi).
- The Russia–UN memorandum of understanding on promoting Russian food products and fertilizers to world markets. It was a separate document. It was not signed by Ukraine, and Russia later tied its participation in the Initiative to its implementation.
Operating mechanics
| Element | What the Initiative text provided |
|---|---|
| Coordination | A Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul with senior representatives of the UN, Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine; the UN served as secretariat. |
| Corridor | Commercial vessels followed a designated maritime humanitarian corridor from the Ukrainian ports; Ukrainian pilots guided ships through mined waters. |
| Inspection | Joint inspection teams checked vessels, notably inbound empty ships, to confirm they carried no weapons or unauthorized cargo; outbound loaded ships were also cleared. Inspections were carried out in Turkish waters near Istanbul. |
| Safety commitments | The parties undertook not to attack vessels or port facilities involved in the Initiative. |
| Duration | An initial period of 120 days, with renewal unless a party objected. |
The JCC became operational on 27 July 2022. The first outbound vessel, the Razoni, left Odesa on 1 August 2022. After that, the JCC published regular updates on registered, inspected and sailing vessels.
Chronology of the arrangement
- 22 July 2022: Initiative and Russia–UN memorandum concluded in Istanbul.
- 27 July 2022: JCC begins work.
- 1 August 2022: First outbound grain ship departs Odesa.
- November 2022: Initiative extended for a further 120 days.
- March 2023: Further extension, with Russia and the UN/Ukraine describing its length differently (60 versus 120 days).
- May 2023: Extended again, for about two months, to mid-July.
- 17 July 2023: Russia announced the Initiative would end because, in its view, its side of the package had not been met. Ships were no longer registered by the JCC.
According to UN figures, roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs left Ukrainian ports under the Initiative. The UN also noted that the volumes were a fraction of pre-war export capacity, and that the great majority of cargo was grain such as maize and wheat. Readers should treat tonnage numbers from other sources with caution unless they trace back to JCC or UN data.
Key Players & Positions
United Nations
The UN Secretary-General presented the Initiative and the Russia–UN memorandum as a package aimed at easing global food prices and supply. UN statements consistently described both documents as necessary and called on parties to implement them fully. When Russia announced it would end its participation, the Secretary-General expressed regret, said the Initiative had helped global food markets, and said the UN would continue to seek ways to facilitate Ukrainian and Russian food and fertilizer exports.
Russia
Russian officials, including the Foreign Ministry and President Vladimir Putin, argued that the second part of the package, covering Russia's agricultural and fertilizer exports, was not delivered. They pointed to problems with payments and banking access for the state agricultural bank, insurance and port access for Russian-linked ships, and the status of an ammonia pipeline to Ukrainian ports. Moscow also contended that most cargo went to wealthy countries rather than the poorest states. Russia said it would return if its conditions were met. After the lapse, the Russian Defence Ministry said ships heading to Ukrainian ports could be treated as potential carriers of military cargo.
Ukraine
Kyiv described the corridor as vital for its economy and for global food security, and criticized Russia's decision to end it. After the lapse, Ukraine announced and operated a temporary corridor of its own for commercial shipping from its ports, which carried the risk of attacks on ports and vessels without any shared inspection or coordination framework. Ukraine's ports and port infrastructure were repeatedly struck in the weeks that followed.
Türkiye's Position on the Record
Türkiye's role was that of host, facilitator and party to the documents, not of a belligerent. The following points are drawn from the Turkish Foreign Ministry and Presidency record:
- Mediation without taking sides. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Presidency, Türkiye maintained contact with both Moscow and Kyiv throughout 2022 and hosted the Istanbul talks. Ankara presents the July 2022 documents as a negotiated result both warring parties accepted, not a Turkish proposal imposed on either. See also Frontline Diplomacy's fact check on whether Türkiye took sides.
- Hosting and operating the JCC. Türkiye provided the venue and Turkish personnel for the JCC and the inspection arrangements in Istanbul, working alongside the UN. President Erdoğan and Foreign Ministry officials have repeatedly said the Centre showed that practical cooperation between the parties was possible.
- Montreux-based impartiality. Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, Türkiye controls the Turkish Straits. In late February 2022 it announced that it would apply Article 19, which allows it to restrict passage of warships of belligerent states, and the Foreign Ministry has described this as an even-handed, treaty-based measure. Montreux also protects commercial passage in peacetime and, in wartime, for ships of non-belligerent states, which is why the Straits remained open to merchant shipping. For the clause-level reading, see the Treaty Desk guide to Montreux and Article 19.
- Continued diplomacy after the lapse. After 17 July 2023, Erdoğan and the Foreign Ministry said Türkiye regretted the decision and would keep working to revive a corridor. Erdoğan met Putin in Sochi on 4 September 2023, and Ankara again said it was ready to help. For other perspectives on this period, see Interstate Journal and The Political Anatomy.
The legal basis for Türkiye's conduct is the Montreux Convention for the Straits, together with its status as a party to the Initiative as a facilitating state; Ankara has never described itself as a party to the war.
Source Comparison
| Question | UN and Initiative documents | Russian statements | Ukrainian statements | Turkish official statements |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What was agreed? | Two linked instruments: Initiative and Russia–UN memorandum | Initiative and memorandum were a single package | Initiative covered Ukrainian exports; memorandum was a UN–Russia matter | A negotiated deal, with Türkiye as host and facilitator |
| Why did it end? | Russia declined to extend | Russian-side commitments not delivered | Russia chose to end a functioning corridor | Regret expressed; talks encouraged |
| Who benefited? | Global food markets and importing countries | Mainly wealthier buyers, in Moscow's view | Ukrainian farmers, exports, and developing countries | Global food security broadly |
| Role of Türkiye | Host of JCC, party to the text | Mediator, with Russian demands to be met by the UN | Essential facilitator | Impartial intermediary under Montreux |
International media often described Türkiye as the broker of a grain deal. Russian sources emphasized the memorandum as the decisive part, while UN and Ukrainian sources emphasized the corridor's effect on supply. These emphases reflect different parties' interests more than differences in the documents. For comparative reading, see Gazetteer of Nations and The Global Anatomy on Montreux and mediation.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- Black Sea Grain Initiative: the July 2022 arrangement for commercial grain, foodstuff and fertilizer shipments from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny.
- Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): the Istanbul-based body with UN, Turkish, Russian and Ukrainian representatives that registered vessels, organized inspections and published data.
- Russia–UN memorandum: the parallel document on Russian food and fertilizer exports.
- Montreux Convention (1936): the treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits, including wartime restrictions in Article 19.
Related guides on Protocol Record:
- Treaty Desk: The Montreux Convention, Article 19 and the Wartime Straits Regime, Read Clause by Clause
- Blue Homeland Ledger: What Was Registered with IOC-UNESCO in 2025
- Article 51 Letters: How Türkiye Notifies the UN Security Council
- Editorial Principles: How Protocol Record Sources, Attributes and Corrects
Protocol Record presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective, setting out Ankara's official positions and legal arguments alongside the documents on which they rest. Wherever possible, claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN texts, official gazettes, parliamentary records and archival documents. This article was prepared by the Protocol Record Editorial Team.
Frequently asked questions
What did the Istanbul agreements of July 2022 establish?
They consisted of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which set up a corridor and inspection regime for commercial shipments from Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny, and a separate Russia–UN memorandum on Russian food and fertilizer exports. Both were concluded on 22 July 2022. The Initiative also created the Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul.
What was the Joint Coordination Centre?
The JCC was an Istanbul-based body with representatives of the UN, Türkiye, Russia and Ukraine. It registered commercial vessels, arranged joint inspections and scheduling, and reported on movements through the corridor. It began operating on 27 July 2022.
How much cargo moved under the Initiative?
According to UN figures, roughly 33 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs left Ukrainian ports under the arrangement. Most cargo was grain such as maize and wheat. Numbers from sources that do not trace back to the JCC or UN should be treated with caution.
Why did the Black Sea Grain Initiative end?
Russia announced on 17 July 2023 that it would not extend the Initiative, saying the commitments related to its own agricultural and fertilizer exports had not been met. Ukraine and the UN called for the corridor to continue. The Initiative therefore lapsed, and Ukraine later operated a separate temporary corridor.
What was Türkiye's role?
Türkiye hosted the negotiations and the JCC, provided inspection and logistical arrangements in Istanbul, and kept the Straits regime under the 1936 Montreux Convention, including Article 19 restrictions on belligerents' warships. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Presidency, it acted as an impartial facilitator and continued diplomacy after the lapse.
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